Claudia Herresthal

Junior Research Fellow in Economics
Queens' College, University of Cambridge

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I am an economist with interest in microeconomic theory and public economics.

I am on the job market this year and available for interviews at
the EEA meetings in Naples, the RES meetings in London
and the ASSA meetings in Atlanta.

Find my CV here.

cl.herresthal(at)gmail.com

Queens' College, University of Cambridge
Silver Street, Cambridge CB3 9ET, UK

Hidden Testing and Selective Disclosure of Evidence (pdf) (Supplementary Appendix)

Job Market Paper

I consider a game with two players, a decision maker and an advisor, who are uncertain about the state of the world. The advisor can sequentially run informative tests and disclose (some or all) of the outcomes to the decision maker. The decision maker then faces a binary choice. Players agree on the optimal choice under certainty, but their preferences are misaligned under uncertainty in that players differ in how they trade off losses from wrong choices. I characterize equilibria of this game. In particular, I compare the case where testing is hidden and the advisor can choose which test outcomes to verifiably disclose to the case where testing is observable. I show that the decision maker is weakly better off when testing is hidden rather than observable if players' preferences are sufficiently misaligned. Otherwise, hidden testing can leave the decision maker strictly worse off. I identify conditions on preference parameters under which both players can be strictly better off when testing is hidden rather than observable.


Performance-Based Rankings and School Quality (pdf)

R&R at The Economic Journal

I study students' inferences about school quality from performance-based rankings in a dynamic setting. Schools differ in location and unobserved quality, students differ in location and ability. Short-lived students observe a school ranking as a signal about schools' relative quality, but this signal also depends on the ability of schools' past intakes. Students apply to schools, trading off expected quality against proximity. Oversubscribed schools select applicants based on an admission rule. In steady-state equilibrium, I find that rankings are more informative if oversubscribed schools select more able applicants or if students care less about distance to school.


Work in Progress

Peer Effects in the Classroom (joint with Simon Burgess)

Markets for Information (joint with Arina Nikandrova)

Matching and Disclosure