Claudia Herresthal

CONTACT INFORMATION	Institute for Microeconomics University of Bonn	Email: claudia.herresthal@uni-bonn.de Webpage: www.cherresthal.com

EMPLOYMENT	UNIVERSITY OF BONN Postdoctoral Researcher	2019 -
	UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE Junior Research Fellow in Economics	2016 - 2019

EDUCATION	UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD DPhil in Economics supervised by Dr. Margaret Meyer	2012 - 2017
	UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD MPhil in Economics	2010 - 2012
	UNIVERSITY OF BRISTOL BSc Economics and Mathematics	2007 - 2010

RESEARCH FIELDS	Microeconomic Theory, Game Theory, Information Economics

PUBLICATIONS	*"Hidden Testing and Selective Disclosure of Evidence"* Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 200, 105402, March 2022
	"Performance-Based Rankings and School Quality" The Economic Journal, Volume 130, Issue 630, August 2020

ACADEMIC AWARDS AND MEMBERSHIPS	Research Affiliate, Organizational Economics, CEPR	2022 -
	Royal Economics Society Junior Fellowship, Royal Economic Society	2015 - 2016
	Chellgren Scholarship, University College, University of Oxford	2012 - 2015
	Departmental Funded Studentship, University of Oxford	2012 - 2015
	Additional Paper Prize, Warsaw International Economics Meeting	2014

TEACHING	MSc ECONOMICS, UNIVERSITY OF BONN Research Module in Microeconomic Theory (21/22)	2021-
	BSc ECONOMICS, UNIVERSITY OF BONN Seminar on Strategic Communication (19/20) Seminar on Consumer Privacy (20,20/21,21)	2019-
	BA ECONOMICS, UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE BA thesis "The Impact of the 2012 Tuition Fee Reform on UK Students" Supervisor for Microeconomic Principles and Problems (3rd year)	2016-2019

	BA Politics Philosophy Economics, University of Oxford	2012-2016
	Tutor for Introductory Microeconomics (1st year)	
	Tutor for Elementary Mathematical Methods (1st year)	
	Tutor for Intermediate Microeconomics (2nd year)	
Invited Talks	University of Marburg; UT Austin; Queen's University Belfast; ITAM	2021
	BI Norwegian Business School; University of Munster	2019
	Toulouse School of Economics; University of Arizona	2018
	Bocconi Workshop on Experimentation; Birkbeck University of London	2017
	University of Cologne	2016
	University of Edinburgh; University of Bonn	2015
	University of Cambridge	2014
Further Talks and Conference Presentations	SAET, online	2021
	Southern Economic Association Meeting, Miami	2019
	Econometric Society Winter Meeting, Naples	2018
	EEA Annual Congress; International Game Theory Conference, Stony Brook; Economic Design Conference, York	2017
	Royal Economic Society Annual Conference	2016
	Econometric Society Winter Meeting; Econometric Society World Congress; GESS Mannheim Summer School	2015
	CE2 workshop Microeconomics; Public Economics UK Conference; Warsaw International Economics Meeting; CIREQ Matching Conference; York Symposium on Game Theory	2014
Professional Service	Refereeing: Economic Journal, Journal of Economic Theory, Econometrica, Games and Economic Behavior, Journal of the European Economic Association, Economic Theory, European Economic Review, International Journal of Game Theory, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization	
	Scientific Committee: RES Symposium for Junior Researchers	2017
	Organizer: Economics Department DPhil and Postdoc Workshop	2014-2015

REFERENCES

Dr. Margaret Meyer
Nuffield College
University of Oxford
margaret.meyer@nuffield.ox.ac.uk
+44 (0) 1865 278570

Dr. Matthew Elliot
Faculty of Economics
University of Cambridge
mle30@cam.ac.uk
+44 (0) 7771 773022

Prof. Marco Ottaviani
Department of Economics
Bocconi University
marco.ottaviani@unibocconi.it
+39 02 5836 3385

Prof. Sujoy Mukerji
School of Economics and Finance
Queen Mary, University of London
s.mukerji@qmul.ac.uk
+44 20 7882 3348

Hidden Testing and Selective Disclosure of Evidence

Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 200, 105402, March 2022

A decision maker faces a choice to withdraw or to retain a product but is uncertain about its safety. An agent can gather information through sequential testing. Players agree on the optimal choice under certainty, but the decision maker has a higher safety standard than the agent. We compare the case where testing is hidden and the agent can choose whether to disclose his findings to the case where testing is observable. The agent can exploit the additional discretion under hidden testing to his advantage if and only if the decision maker is sufficiently inclined to retain the product. Hidden testing then yields a Pareto improvement over observable testing if the conflict between players is larger than some threshold, but leaves the decision maker worse off and the agent better off if the conflict is smaller than this threshold.

Performance-Based Rankings and School Quality

The Economic Journal, Volume 130, Issue 630, August 2020

I study students' inferences about school quality from performance-based rankings in a dynamic setting. Schools differ in location and unobserved quality, students differ in location and ability. Short-lived students observe a school ranking as a signal about schools' relative quality, but this signal also depends on the ability of schools' past intakes. Students apply to schools, trading off expected quality against proximity. Oversubscribed schools select applicants based on an admission rule. In steady-state equilibrium, I find that rankings are more informative if more able applicants are given priority in admissions or if students care less about distance to school.