

Claudia Herresthal

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INFORMATION	Webpage: www.cherresthal.com	
EMPLOYMENT	BANKING SUPERVISION, GERMAN BUNDESBANK	2025 - present
	POSTDOCTORAL RESEARCH POSITION, UNIVERSITY OF BONN	2019 - 2025
	INTERIM PROFESSORSHIP, UNIVERSITY OF BONN	04/2024 - 09/2024
	JUNIOR RESEARCH FELLOWSHIP, UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE	2016 - 2019
EDUCATION	DPhil ECONOMICS, UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD	2012 - 2017
	MPhil ECONOMICS, UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD	2010 - 2012
	BSc ECONOMICS AND MATHEMATICS, UNIVERSITY OF BRISTOL	2007 - 2010
RESEARCH FIELDS	Microeconomic Theory: Game Theory, Information Economics, Organizational Economics	
PUBLICATIONS	Hidden Testing and Selective Disclosure of Evidence Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 200, 105402, March 2022	
	Performance-Based Rankings and School Quality The Economic Journal, Volume 130, Issue 630, August 2020	
WORKING PAPERS	Data Linkage between Markets: Hidden Dangers and Unexpected Benefits <i>joint with Tatiana Mayskaya and Arina Nikandrova</i>	
WORK IN PROGRESS	Optimal Transparency in Task Design <i>joint with Helene Mass</i>	
AWARDS	RESEARCH AFFILIATE, CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC POLICY RESEARCH	2022 - present
	Royal Economics Society Junior Fellowship, Royal Economic Society	2015 - 2016
	Chellgren Scholarship, University College, University of Oxford	2012 - 2015
	Departmental Funded Studentship, University of Oxford	2012 - 2015
TEACHING	BSc AND MSc ECONOMICS, UNIVERSITY OF BONN	
	Lecture Series on Industrial Organization (BSc)	
	Lecture Series on Information Economics (BSc)	
	Research module in Microeconomic Theory (MSc)	
	Seminars on Strategic Communication, Disclosure, Consumer Privacy (BSc)	
	BA ECONOMICS, UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE	
	Supervisions for Microeconomic Principles and Problems (3rd year)	
	BA POLITICS PHILOSOPHY ECONOMICS, UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD	
	Tutorials for Introductory Microeconomics (1st year), Elementary Mathematical Methods (1st year), Intermediate Microeconomics (2nd year)	

INVITED TALKS	University of Manchester	2024
	University of Marburg; UT Austin; Queen's University Belfast; ITAM	2021
	BI Norwegian Business School; University of Munster	2019
	Toulouse School of Economics; University of Arizona	2018
	Bocconi Workshop on Experimentation; Birkbeck University of London	2017
	University of Cologne	2016
	University of Edinburgh; University of Bonn	2015
	University of Cambridge	2014
CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS	MaCCI Annual Conference, Mannheim	2025
	EEA-ESEM Annual Congress, Rotterdam; EARIE, Amsterdam	2024
	SAET, online	2021
	Southern Economic Association Meeting, Miami	2019
	Econometric Society Winter Meeting, Naples	2018
	EEA Annual Congress; International Game Theory Conference, Stony Brook;	2017
	Economic Design Conference, York	
	Royal Economic Society Annual Conference	2016
	Econometric Society Winter Meeting; Econometric Society World Congress;	2015
	GESS Mannheim Summer School	
	CE2 workshop Microeconomics; Public Economics UK Conference;	2014
	Warsaw International Economics Meeting; CIREQ Matching Conference;	
	York Symposium on Game Theory	
PROFESSIONAL SERVICE	Refereeing: Econometrica, Journal of Economic Theory, Games and Economic Behavior, Economic Journal, Journal of the European Economic Association, Economic Theory, European Economic Review, International Journal of Game Theory, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization	
	Scientific Committee: RES Symposium for Junior Researchers	2017
	Organizer: Economics Department DPhil and Postdoc Workshop	2014-2015
REFERENCES	Dr. Margaret Meyer	Prof. Dezső Szalay
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	University of Oxford	University of Bonn
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PUBLICATION
ABSTRACTS

[Hidden Testing and Selective Disclosure of Evidence](#)

Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 200, 105402, March 2022

A decision maker faces a choice to withdraw or to retain a product but is uncertain about its safety. An agent can gather information through sequential testing. Players agree on the optimal choice under certainty, but the decision maker has a higher safety standard than the agent. We compare the case where testing is hidden and the agent can choose whether to disclose his findings to the case where testing is observable. The agent can exploit the additional discretion under hidden testing to his advantage if and only if the decision maker is sufficiently inclined to retain the product. Hidden testing then yields a Pareto improvement over observable testing if the conflict between players is larger than some threshold, but leaves the decision maker worse off and the agent better off if the conflict is smaller than this threshold.

[Performance-Based Rankings and School Quality](#)

The Economic Journal, Volume 130, Issue 630, August 2020

I study students' inferences about school quality from performance-based rankings in a dynamic setting. Schools differ in location and unobserved quality, students differ in location and ability. Short-lived students observe a school ranking as a signal about schools' relative quality, but this signal also depends on the ability of schools' past intakes. Students apply to schools, trading off expected quality against proximity. Oversubscribed schools select applicants based on an admission rule. In steady-state equilibrium, I find that rankings are more informative if more able applicants are given priority in admissions or if students care less about distance to school.

WORKING PAPER
ABSTRACTS

[Data Linkage between Markets: Hidden Dangers and Unexpected Benefits](#)

joint with Tatiana Mayskaya and Arina Nikandrova

A company uses consumer data from product sales to offer personalized insurance. When consumers are predominantly of high risk, data linkage between product and insurance markets benefits both high- and low-risk consumers by generating efficiency gains in the insurance market, which are partially passed on to consumers via the product market. When consumers are predominantly of low risk, data linkage can harm both types. High-risk consumers lose rents in the insurance market, while low-risk consumers face negative externalities from sophisticated high-risk consumers via the product market.